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Abstract—Traffic analysis has been exploited by attackers to
threaten user privacy in wireless networks. As an example, a
user’s online activities may be exposed to strangers, even if the
traffic is encrypted. However, the existing defense mechanisms
against traffic analysis, such as packet padding and traffic
morphing, are inefficient because they add noise traffic to blur
the traffic features, therefore introducing significant overhead.
In this paper, we propose the traffic reshaping technique
to thwart traffic analysis. It creates multiple virtual media
access control (MAC) interfaces over a single wireless card,
dynamically schedules packets over these interfaces, thereby
reshaping the packet features on each virtual interface. Hence,
features of the original traffic are obscured and unavailable
for the adversary to infer users’ online activities. Unlike the
existing solutions, traffic reshaping enhances privacy protection
without incurring overhead in items of adding noise traffic. We
evaluate the performance of traffic reshaping through trace-
based experiments. The results show that traffic reshaping is
effective and efficient in defending against the traffic analysis
attacks.
Keywords-Traffic Reshaping, Traffic Analysis, Privacy, Users’
Online Activities, Virtualization
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the shared-medium nature of wireless links, ad-
versaries can easily eavesdrop on the traffic from and to a
specific user. Even if the traffic is encrypted, traffic features
are still exposed to adversaries, and the user may suffer
from traffic analysis attacks. Even worse, it may cause
many upper-layer side-channel information leaks, which
discovered in various online applications, such as web
browsing [1], [2], video-streaming [3], and voice-over-IP
(VoIP) applications [4], [5].
Traffic analysis extracts identifiable traffic features, such
as packet size, frequency of a packet and the packet interar-
rival time, from traffic flows, and then associates the features
with certain facts or secrets. Machine learning techniques,
such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Neural Network
(NN), Bayesian techniques and Hidden Markov Models
(HMM), can be used to enhance the accuracy of traffic
analysis. Recent studies show that through traffic analysis
an adversary can identify user’s online activities (e.g., web-
browsing, chatting, online gaming, downloading, uploading,
online video and BitTorrent (BT)) [6] and glean what other
users are browsing [1] in a few seconds with high accuracy.
It turns out that traffic analysis has been a severe threats to
user privacy in wireless networks.
A commonly used technique to defend against traffic
analysis is packet padding [1], [2] (e.g., padding all packets
to the same length), which usually incurs significant commu-
nication overhead, hence it is not an ideal solution. Traffic
morphing [7], which modifies packet sizes to morph the
network traffic from one class to another, is proposed to
defend against traffic analysis in VoIP and web-browsing
applications. But the communication overhead in terms of
the increased payloads, reported from 15.4% to 38.9% [7],
are not negligible.
It is very challenging to defend against traffic analysis
effectively and efficiently. In this paper, we propose a novel
approach, traffic reshaping, to prevent adversaries from
inferring users’ online activities through traffic analysis.
Traffic reshaping creates multiple virtual MAC interfaces
over a single wireless card, dynamically assigns packets
over these interfaces, thereby changing the packet features
on each virtual interface. Since traffic reshaping does not
use packet splitting and reassembling, unlike the existing
approaches (e.g., packet padding and traffic morphing), it
does not incur additional overhead for noise traffic. The
only message overhead introduced by traffic reshaping is
for configuring virtual interfaces. Hence, traffic reshaping
achieves better efficiency and performs well in defending
against traffic analysis. Furthermore, traffic reshaping is a
MAC layer solution and transparent to high level protocols.
We evaluate the performance of traffic reshaping through
trace-based experiments. The results show that the accuracy
of traffic analysis decreases from 83.24% to 43.69% when
the eavesdropping duration is 5 seconds. When the eaves-
dropping duration is extended to 1 minute, the accuracy
remains unchanged as 44.49%, as compared with that of
91.86% under the situation without traffic reshaping.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We present the background of our work in Section II. We
then describe the detailed design of traffic reshaping against
traffic analysis in Section III. In Section IV, we evaluate
the traffic reshaping through real trace-based experiments.
Section V discusses the implications and Section VI sum-
marizes the related work. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VII.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Attack Model
The shared-medium nature of wireless links poses a great
threat to user privacy. It is easy for an adversary to keep
monitoring traffic traces from and to a specific user with
sniffer software (e.g., Wireshark, Aircrack-ng) in current
local area networks (WLANs) settings. Based on these traffic
traces, an attacker is able to identify traffic features and use
traffic analysis to link the features to certain facts or secrets.
As an example, the analysis based on the traffic features
collected in a few seconds in the MAC layer is able to
yield accurate estimation of users’ online activities (i.e.,
the particular network application or service that a user is
running), no matter what encryption schemes are used [6].
A user’s online activities is regarded as highly private and
sensitive, since the user usually do not want other persons
in the same WLAN to track what they are doing on the
Internet (e.g., web-browsing, chatting, online gaming and
downloading, etc.). In addition, it is more risky that an
adversary performs further attacks to get more sensitive
personal information, such as which websites or contents
a particular user is reading.
Traffic features, such as average packet interarrival time,
average packet size and packet size distribution, can be
used to profile users’ actual online activities. For example,
chatting and gaming are low traffic applications with smaller
packets. Downloading and uploading are high traffic applica-
tions with large packet size in downlink and uplink, respec-
tively. Also, online video demonstrates a relatively stable
data rate and browsing contains bursty traffic. Figure 1 shows
the packet size probability of distribution function (PDF) of
seven popular online applications measured in residential
environments1 when the applications receive packets from
the AP. It is obvious that traffic features can be employed
to classify most applications.
Various traffic classification techniques, such as SVM
and NN algorithms, Bayesian techniques, HMM, have been
extensively studied. According to [6], the adversaries can
accurately tell which online applications are active through
SVM and NN algorithms. The accuracy reaches around
80% when the eavesdropping duration is 5 seconds. If
eavesdroppers monitor the traffic for one minute, the clas-
sification accuracy is higher than 90% and even achieves
100% accuracy in most of the situations.
B. Existing Defense Against Traffic Analysis
The research defending against traffic analysis can be
categorized into the following groups.
Traffic padding and packet padding are presented
in [1], [2], [8], [9] to counter traffic analysis. Although these
1The received signal strength indicator is around -50dBm in the mea-
surement.
 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Packet Size (bytes)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 D
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
Browsing
Chatting
Online Gaming
Downloading
Uploading
Online Video
BitTorrent (BT)
 
Figure 1. Packet size PDF of seven popular applications on receiver’s side
approaches may alleviate the problem, they are usually inef-
ficient and incur high overheads. According to [7], padding
the packets to the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)
length of 1500 bytes incurs an overhead of 156.5%, and
the adversary is still able to perform accurate classification
with accuracy 86.2%.
Traffic morphing is proposed in [7] to thwart traffic
analysis by modifying one class of traffic to look like an-
other class. Hence, traffic morphing reduces the accuracy of
traffic classification while incurring much less overhead than
packet padding. Results in [7] show that the traffic morphing
reduces the VoIP classifier’s accuracy from 71% to 54%
with 15.4% overhead on average. Likewise, the accuracy
of the web classifier is reduced from 98.4% to 63.4% with
38.9% overhead. The overhead of traffic morphing for VoIP
and HTTP applications, is not negligible. In addition, traffic
morphing only changes the packet size, hence other features
may still be sufficient for classification.
Identifier-free approaches [10], [11], which conceal the
identifiers (i.e., MAC addresses) of users, can be utilized
to prevent the adversary from associating the traffic features
with the user’s identity, thereby preserving the user’s privacy
in wireless networks. However, the physical layer measure-
ments on traffic statistics (e.g., received signal strength indi-
cator (RSSI) values) allow the adversary to link the packets
with a specific user [12]. On the other hand, identifier-free
approaches require to encrypt all the packets, including the
packet header, control and management frames, thus the
overhead of encryption and key managements can not be
overlooked.
Frequency hopping changes the frequency of the com-
munication channel periodically. It was designed to defeat
frequency jamming and has the potential of preventing the
adversary from obtaining the whole traffic traces from a
user [13], thereby mitigating traffic analysis attacks.
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Pseudonym schemes [14], [15] randomly change the
MAC address of a user, so that adversary cannot track
the entire traffic stream between the user and the AP.
However, both frequency hopping and pseudonym schemes
are insufficient to prevent traffic analysis attacks [6], [16],
[10], because they do not obscure the traffic features when
the traffic is partitioned over a single frequency channel or a
specific MAC address. Hence, a single partition (i.e., piece
of traffic trace) may release enough sensitive information
for the adversary to perform traffic analysis accurately.
For example, since pseudonym schemes only change MAC
addresses each session or when idle, all the packets sent
under one pseudonym are still linkable [10].
Physical space security and jamming approaches aim
to reduce the number of packets that can be overheard
by an eavesdropper. Lakshmanan et al. [17] and Sheth
et al. [18] demonstrate that using directional antennas to
focus transmissions within a secure physical space and
jamming [19] have been suggested as methods to mitigate
an eavesdropper’s ability to overhear wireless packets. An
intelligent jamming strategy deployed at potential eaves-
dropper locations can effectively raise the noise level to
neutralize eavesdroppers, but jamming will also interfere
with legitimate communications and degrade the network’s
performance [12].
In summary, the inefficiency of above existing approaches
shows the following shortcomings. (1) Besides packet size,
other traffic features (e.g., packet interarrival time) can
still be used for traffic analysis. (2) The approaches par-
titioning the traffic over different frequency channels (i.e.,
frequency hopping) or using different MAC addresses (i.e.,
pseudonym) are at a coarse granularity, so the individual
partitions of traffic may still lead to information leaks.
Further, the traffic partitioning algorithms are naive and
do not change the traffic features in a single partition. If
the adversary accumulates the traffic traces in discrete time
intervals, it is as if the adversary is monitoring all traffic in
a smaller time scale. (3) Communication overhead (e.g., in
padding and traffic morphing) or operational overhead (e.g.,
in identifier-free approaches) cannot be ignored.
In this paper, we use traffic reshaping to overcome above
shortcomings and show that it is able to significantly im-
prove the traditional defense against traffic analysis over the
wireless links.
III. TRAFFIC RESHAPING
A. Overview
The goal of traffic reshaping is to enhance privacy pro-
tection by preventing information leaks without incurring
noticeable overhead. To obscure traffic features without
padding, we reshape the original traffic by dividing its
packets into multiple sub-flows. Let each sub-flow be trans-
mitted on a virtual wireless link and show partial patterns
of the original traffic. Then attackers only get parts of traffic
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Figure 2. Configuration
information, which may cause the misidentification of traffic
analysis attacks.
Traffic reshaping executes in the MAC layer, hence, we
only need to modify wireless device driver to support it. The
modification includes two aspects.
First, we need to design communication protocols to sup-
port multiple virtual interfaces. We virtualize multiple virtual
interfaces on Multiband Atheros Driver for WiFi (MadWifi).
MadWifi is a popular WLAN driver and has the capability
of creating multiple virtual MAC interfaces over a single
physical interface [20]. Virtual interfaces are configured with
different MAC addresses, but work in the same channel and
keep association with the same AP. In traffic reshaping, each
interface is treated as a fully functional, regular network
interface, but only one adapter is active at any given time.
Communication protocols are described in Section III-B.
Second, traffic reshaping explores an optimal schedul-
ing, referred as reshaping algorithm, to partition traffic
over virtual interfaces at a fine granularity in real time.
Accordingly, traffic features (e.g., packet size distribution,
packet interarrival time) on individual MAC interfaces shows
different traffic patterns. Since, traffic reshaping does not
add new data into the wireless link, it avoids the overhead
for noise traffic. The reshaping algorithm is depicted in
Section III-C.
B. Communications Between AP and Virtual Interfaces
1) Configuration: In traffic reshaping, both the AP and
clients must be modified to support multiple virtual inter-
faces. In our design, virtual MAC addresses are assigned by
the AP. The process includes four steps which are depicted
in Figure 2. (1) First of all, a wireless client sends out a
message to request virtual interfaces and their corresponding
MAC addresses. (2) Upon receiving the request, the AP
first chooses the number of virtual interfaces to create,
denoted as I , determined by the privacy requirement and
the resource availability. (3) Then the AP chooses unused
addresses from its MAC address pool. The MAC address
pool returns unused MAC address to the AP. Because there
are 48 bits in a MAC address, randomly chosen addresses
has a low probability of collision in small networks due
to the birthday paradox. If N is the number of MAC
addresses in the WLAN, the collision probability is about(
1− 248!/248N (248 −N)!). (4) Finally, the AP sends a
reply that includes both the nonce from the request packet
and the assigned MAC addresses.
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 Figure 3. Data transmission between an AP and a user
The packets used in configuration are encrypted, thus the
adversary does not know the mapping between the physical
address and the virtual MAC addresses. When a wireless
client receives the response from AP, it checks if the nonce
corresponds to the request that it has sent. If so, it begins
to virtualize multiple MAC interfaces and configure them
with the corresponding MAC addresses. The AP is able to
recycle and dynamically configure virtual MAC interfaces
according to the change of resource availability and client
requirements.
2) Data Transmission: When a client is ready to send
a packet to the AP, it first adopts the reshaping algorithm
(described in Section III-C) to determine a specific virtual
interface. The virtual MAC interface (e.g., Interface #0
shown in Figure 3) encapsulates an outgoing packet by
filling the source address of the packet with its own MAC
address, then the interface sends the packet to the AP. When
the AP receives the packets, it should find the MAC Header
and check the source address. If the address belongs to a
virtual MAC interface, the AP needs to replace the source
address by the unique physical MAC address of that wireless
client. The MAC address translation should be done in order
to circumvent the ARP protocol, hence the remote servers
do not need any modifications.
When remote servers send packets to a client, packets are
first sent to the AP which the client is associated with. AP
first checks whether the destination uses virtual interfaces
or not. If not, it sends the packet to the destination as
usual. Otherwise, the AP employs the reshaping algorithm to
determine a specific virtual interface and replaces the unique
physical MAC address with the corresponding virtual MAC
address (Interface #n shown in Figure 3). After that, the
packet is sent to the client through that virtual interface. On
the client side, the MAC layer of the client has been modified
to receive all the packets whose destination address is one
of its virtual MAC addresses. Then, it translates the virtual
MAC address to the unique physical MAC address and sends
the packets to the upper layers. The MAC address translation
makes the modification in the MAC layer transparent to
upper layers.
C. Reshaping Algorithm
1) Optimization Problem: The reshaping algorithm aims
to obscure original traffic features by dispatching the pack-
ets to multiple virtual interfaces. Packets distributed into
different interfaces look as if they are from independent
applications. The reshaping algorithm is running on both the
client and AP side. In detail, we denote the number of virtual
interfaces as I . Packets scheduled to virtual interfaces are
described as a set S = (s1, s2, · · · , sk, · · · , sN), (N → ∞).
The reshaping algorithm is considered as a function to map
a packet to a virtual interface in real time:
F (sk) = i, i ∈ [1, I].
Let Si represent the set of packets on interface i. Si is a
subset of S, and ∪iSi = S, Si∩Sj = Ø. For example, using
the Random Algorithm (RA), a packet sk is randomly sched-
uled on virtual interface i, i.e., i = mod(random[1, I]). In
Round-Robin (RR) algorithm, packet sk is scheduled on
virtual interface i = mod[k, I].
In traffic reshaping, the interarrival time of packets over
individual interfaces is automatically changed from the orig-
inal traffic. Hence, we focus on changing the distribution of
the packet size to deceive the adversaries.
First, define the packet size of sk as L (sk). The
maximum packet size of set S is denoted as `max. As-
sume there are L possible packet size ranges, {(0, `1],
(`1, `2], · · · , (`L−1, `L]}, where `L = `max. To describe the
packet distribution of the original traffic, Pj , (Pj ∈ [0, 1]) is
denoted as the probability of packet size which falls into a
particular range (`j−1, `j ].
Pj = Pr({sk ∈ S : L (sk) ∈ (`j−1, `j ]}), (
L∑
j=1
Pj = 1).
Similarly, pij is denoted as the probability of packets
whose size is among (`j−1, `j ] on the virtual interface
i. We design the reshaping algorithm to alter the packet
size distribution on each interface, so that the traffic is
unidentifiable or looks like another application. The target
probability distribution on interface i is denoted as φi, and
φi = [φi1, φ
i
2, · · · , φij , · · · , φiL], where φij is defined as the
target probability of packet sizes within (`j−1, `j ] on the
virtual interface i. Preferably, pij will close to φ
i
j , hence the
reshaping algorithm can be formulated as an optimization
problem with different target probability distribution:
596
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Figure 4. OR schedules a BT application by packet size ranges. Three ranges are (0, 525], (525, 1050], (1050, 1576].
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Figure 5. OR schedules a BT application by packet sizes. A packet sk is distributed to virtual interface i = mod[L (sk), I].
min
I∑
i=1
√√√√( L∑
j=1
∣∣φij − pij∣∣2
)
sub
I∑
i=1
pijN (i) = PjN;
I∑
i=1
N (i) = N;
L∑
j=1
φij = 1;
L∑
j=1
pij = 1;
φij , p
i
j ∈ [0, 1]; i ∈ [1, I]; j ∈ [1, L];
(1)
where N (i) is the number of packets on the interface i,
and N is the total number of packets. Traffic reshaping
optimality is desired, so that packets are scheduled to hide
the original traffic features in the “best” way. Here, the
“best” scheduling is defined by the target distribution, which
disguises the original traffic as the target traffic on individual
wireless interfaces. Hence, different reshaping algorithms
over multiple virtual wireless interfaces can be designed to
achieve different target distributions.
2) Algorithm Description: With multiple MAC layer
interfaces, protection against traffic analysis is not automat-
ically achieved. For example, under the naive algorithms,
such as RA and RR, if an attack eavesdrops on any wireless
interfaces for a longer time period, the attacker is able to
collect enough traffic information to obtain users’ online
activities. Hence, efficient and satisfiable algorithms should
be able to hide traffic features of the original traffic on in-
dividual wireless interfaces. Next, we propose an intelligent
scheduling algorithm, named Orthogonal Reshaping (OR).
OR dispatches the packets with a certain size range to a
specific virtual interface and makes the distribution of virtual
interfaces unidentifiable. In OR, the packet size distribution
of each virtual interface is orthogonal to each other. orthog-
onal means the dot product of two target distribution should
be zero. It is described as follows.
∀{i1, i2 ∈ [1, I]}, φi1 · φi2 =
L∑
j=1
(
φi1j φ
i2
j
)
= 0 (2)
Since φij ∈ [0, 1], the orthogonality leads to ∀j ∈ [1, L],
∃!i : φij = 1.
OR simplifies the selection of target distribution, and
makes the online optimization to Equation (1) achievable
by satisfying pij = φ
i
j . In this case, the optimal solution is
achieved without knowing the future traffic.
Actually, OR can be regarded as a hash function, which
maps multiple packet sizes to a certain virtual interface.
Different mappings show different packet distributions. For
example, L = I . Packets among each packet size range
belong to a virtual interface. Assuming I = 3, L = 3,
we divide the packet size into three ranges, which have
similar length. Then, `1 = 525, `2 = 1050, `3 = 1576.
To hide a BitTorrent (BT) application, we dispatch the
packets whose size less than `1 to interface 1, size within
(`1, `2] to interface 2, and others to interface 3. That means
φ1 = [1, 0, 0], φ2 = [0, 1, 0] and φ3 = [0, 0, 1]. The packets
of each interface are shown in Figure 4. We can see that
different groups of packets are separated apart by OR and
each interface only has the packets within the same range.
The PDF of packet size for the original traffic and each
virtual interface is shown in Figure 4(e). The distribution
of each interface differs from each other and is also very
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different from the original traffic.
In addition, the scheduling algorithms can be flexibly
selected by users. In the above example, the traffic over
each virtual interface has a small packet size range. Next,
we give another example of OR to make the traffic have
a large packet size range. This is a good property to
prevent adversaries from telling if the traffic reshaping
technique is being used. We set L = `max. A packet sk
with the size L (sk) is distributed to virtual interface i,
i = mod[L (sk), I]. We take the same BT application as
an example. I = 3. The packets of each interface are
shown in Figure 5. We see three virtual interfaces have very
different traffic features. Through these two examples, we
show that different scheduling policies may give different
traffic reshaping results.
OR may be adopted on both the AP side and the client
side. Each side can employ different parameters and dynam-
ically change according to different applications. Further,
we describe the packet distribution based on packet size in
above algorithms. Other features may also be employed to
characterize the distribution (e.g., number of packets).
3) Parameter Selection: From Equation (1), we can see
that parameters L, I and φij need to be tuned dynamically for
different applications. The selection rules are listed below.
Number of L. L is used to partition the distribution of
packet size. Its selection is related to the reshaping algo-
rithm. We can determine L according to privacy requirement
and features of different applications. We observe that the
main packet size of each application is distributed around
two ranges: [108, 232] and [1546, 1576]. So we can divide
the packet size into three ranges: (0, 232], (232, 1540] and
(1540, 1576]. So generally, we set L ≥ 3.
Number of I . We denote the total number of MAC
addresses in the WLAN as N . If the attacker has no
additional information, the privacy entropy H is equal to
log2N [14]. Hence if we increase I , N will be larger and
users may get more privacy protection. But too many MAC
addresses may cost more resources and increase operation
costs. We have evaluated the effect of I on performance
of reshaping algorithms in Section IV-C. Generally, I = 3
is enough for OR to perform well. In addition, I can be
adjusted dynamically according to the privacy requirement
and the resource availability.
Configuration of φij . φij is correlative with L. It should
be design carefully to conceal traffic features of the original
traffic and also prevent the adversary from linking multiple
virtual interfaces with a certain user.
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of traffic reshaping through
trace-based experiments, and the real traces are collected
by Intel Wireless WiFi Link 4965AGN network cards with
Libpcap library and Proxim AP-2000 11b/g Cardbus Series
(Atheros 5212 chipset) network cards with the MadWifi
Table I
FEATURES ON VIRTUAL INTERFACES (FROM AP TO THE USER)
App. Features Original OR
(byte, second) i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
br. Avg. packet size 1013.2 134.0 780.6 1574.3
br. Interarrival time 0.0284 0.0918 0.1087 0.0278
ch. Avg. packet size 269.1 145.3 517.3 1576.0
ch. Interarrival time 0.9901 1.1022 0.0687 0.0257
ga. Avg. packet size 459.5 138.8 689.66 1575.3
ga. Interarrival time 0.3084 0.4970 0.6899 0.4835
do. Avg. packet size 1575.3 136.8 536.7 1576.0
do. Interarrival time 0.0023 0.4242 0.5138 0.0023
up. Avg. packet size 132.8 131.4 379.0 1576.0
up. Interarrival time 0.0301 0.0302 0.0123 0.0965
vo. Avg. packet size 1547.6 129.6 528.5 1576.0
vo. Interarrival time 0.0119 0.3159 0.5493 0.0122
bt. Avg. packet size 962.04 143.9 1062.5 1568.0
bt. Interarrival time 0.0247 0.0634 0.2331 0.0486
driver (version madwifi-0.9.4 branch). The classification
system in [6], including SVM and NN algorithms, is used to
identify users’ online activities. We validate the effectiveness
and efficiency of OR and compare it with other defending
schemes. Results show that traffic reshaping, which signifi-
cantly reduces the classification accuracy without incurring
additional overhead, performs better than packet padding
and traffic morphing. We also compare the performance
of four scheduling algorithms, including frequency hopping
(FH) scheme2, RR, RA and OR. Furthermore, the effect of
parameters is evaluated.
Two metrics, accuracy and false positive (FP), are em-
ployed to evaluate the performance of traffic reshaping.
Accuracy is the percentage of correctly classified instances
among the total number of instances, and mean accuracy is
defined as overall average recognition probability of clas-
sifiers. Differently, FP reflects the percent of non-class X
packets incorrectly classified as belonging to class X [22].
A. Scenarios
The accuracy of traffic classification in WLANs at home is
higher than those in public areas and university campus [6].
Hence, if traffic reshaping is able to reduce the classifi-
cation accuracy largely in home scenarios, it will perform
better in public, enterprise and university campus WLANs.
Therefore, we evaluate performance of traffic reshaping
in home scenarios. We get traffic traces at home with
Comcast Internet and Time Warner Cable as the Internet
services. WLANs support 802.11a/b/g modes and the data
rate may fluctuate from 1Mbps to 54Mbps. We examine
seven applications, including web browsing, chatting, online
game, downloading, uploading, online video and BT. We
totally get more than 50 hours of traffic traces. By using the
above traffic traces, we evaluate traffic reshaping through
simulations. The eavesdropping duration (denoted as W ) is
2We adopt FH by using VirtualWiFi [21] and channels are accessed in
the order of 1,6,11. The active time period for each channel is 500ms.
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Table II
ACCURACY OF CLASSIFICATION (W = 5s)
App. Original (%) FH (%) RA (%) RR (%) OR (%)
br. 37.77 59.15 58.74 59.16 1.90
ch. 77.93 86.17 85.82 81.63 84.21
ga. 88.18 61.01 60.24 61.35 26.61
do. 99.88 98.26 95.59 94.25 99.95
up. 95.92 91.76 89.30 94.98 90.78
vo. 93.32 96.37 86.01 86.52 0.00
bt. 89.68 33.88 57.69 59.04 2.35
Mean 83.24 75.23 76.20 76.70 43.69
Table III
ACCURACY OF CLASSIFICATION (W = 60s)
App. Original (%) FH (%) RA (%) RR (%) OR (%)
br. 72.94 72.59 76.72 77.90 0.57
ch. 85.29 81.09 67.67 64.89 93.86
ga. 93.74 79.71 81.36 81.67 23.64
do. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.96
up. 95.92 91.76 89.30 94.98 90.78
vo. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.00
bt. 95.14 93.63 96.44 97.02 2.61
Mean 91.86 88.40 87.36 88.07 44.49
used to represent the shortest time duration of traffic for
classification each time.
B. Traffic Features
By default, we set the number of virtual interfaces, I = 3.
Packet sizes are mostly divided into three ranges (L = 3):
(0, 232], (232, 1540] and (1540, 1576]. Target distributions
of different applications in OR are orthogonal (φ1 = [1, 0, 0],
φ2 = [0, 1, 0] and φ3 = [0, 0, 1]).
By using the above configuration, we present the changes
of features under traffic reshaping in Table I. The features
are gotten according to the same processing as [6]. Because
the eavesdropping duration W is mostly set at 5 seconds,
the idle time without data transmission, which is beyond 5
seconds, is filtered out and is not calculated into the packet
interarrival time. We see that the packet features of virtual
interfaces greatly differ from their original values and are
also different from each other. The average interarrival time
is mostly larger than that of the original traffic.
C. Effectiveness
We use the same classification system as in [6], including
SVM and NN techniques, to infer users’ online activities
and evaluate the performance of traffic reshaping. Features
we employed in the classification are number of pack-
ets, max/min/average/standard deviation of packet size, and
packet interarrival time in downlink and uplink. We present
the highest classification accuracy based on these features.
Classification system in [6] can infer what a user is doing
with the accuracy about 83.24% in 5 seconds. The accuracy
achieves 91.86% when the eavesdropping duration, W , lasts
for 1 minute. From Table II and Table III, we see that the
accuracies of FH, RA and RR are all around 75%, which is
close to the original result, 83.24%. Each application has
similar accuracy. When W is extended to 1 minute, the
accuracies of FH, RA and RR rise to about 88%. Because
the main feature, “average packet size,” is almost unchanged
in FH, RA and RR, hence they do not bring down the
classification accuracy of the original traffic. Therefore, FH,
RA and RR can hardly prevent attackers from inferring the
users’ online activities.
OR decreases the classification accuracy quite markedly,
shown in Table II and Table III. It has the lowest classifica-
tion accuracy, 43.69%, among four algorithms. Furthermore,
the accuracies in OR barely rise along with the increase of
W . They nearly remain unchanged at 44.49% when W is
set at 60 seconds.
From the results of the classification accuracy, we find
that browsing, online video and BT applications are uniden-
tifiable in OR. In contrast, chatting and downloading achieve
high accuracy, even larger than the original case. The reason
is that most packet sizes of applications are distributed
around two ranges: [108, 232] and [1546, 1576], which look
like chatting and downloading, respectively. Thus the clas-
sification tends to identifying the traffic in OR as chatting
or downloading.
However, high accuracy does not mean an adversary is
easy to detect the application. To describe it more clearly,
we introduce FP, which denotes the percentage of members
of other classes incorrectly classified as belonging to this
class. The FP of classification is presented in Table IV. We
see that the FP of OR, which is around 9%, is much larger
than the original traffic. Also, the FP is nearly unchanged
when the eavesdropping duration increases. High FP may
cause many false identifications for the adversary. Chatting
and downloading both have high FP than other applications.
For instance, 34.77% of packets from other applications
are regarded as downloading if the traffic is protected by
OR. Among all of the applications, only uploading has high
accuracy and very low FP. The reason is that uploading is
the only application which has low traffic in downlink but
high traffic in uplink, compared with other applications. In
summary, OR performs better than other algorithms. It is
effective to defend against traffic analysis on inferring users’
online activities.
Table V describes the performance of OR when virtual
interface I changes from 2 to 5. For I = 2, we set
L = 2; and two packet size ranges are (0, 1500] and
(1500, 1576]. When I = 5, we set L = 5. The packet size
is divided into five ranges: (0, 232], (232, 500], (500, 1000],
(1000, 1540] and (1540, 1576]. We get the value of φi in OR
by Expression 2. From Table V, we see that the accuracy
decreases along with the increase of I , and the decrease is
less and less evident. Hence, we generally set I = 3 and
it is enough for OR to thwart the traffic analysis attack on
users’ online activities.
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Table IV
FP OF CLASSIFICATION
App. W = 5s W = 60s
Original (%) OR (%) Original (%) OR (%)
br. 2.73 1.91 1.51 2.30
ch. 2.21 21.01 1.45 19.73
ga. 3.29 3.55 1.86 1.54
do. 0.93 34.77 0.13 35.47
up. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
vo. 1.05 0.44 0.30 0.00
bt. 9.32 4.00 4.25 5.72
Mean 2.80 9.38 1.36 9.25
Table V
ACCURACY CHANGES BY DIFFERENT VIRTUAL INTERFACES I
App. OR (%)
I = 2 I = 3 I = 5
br. 2.82 1.90 1.52
ch. 91.63 84.21 90.35
ga. 56.83 26.61 17.24
do. 99.92 99.95 99.37
up. 95.59 90.78 90.53
vo. 0.00 0.00 0.00
bt. 2.47 2.35 0.49
Mean 49.89 43.69 42.79
D. Efficiency
We compare the efficiency of traffic reshaping with packet
padding and traffic morphing. The results of our experi-
ments, shown in Table VI, clearly illustrate the superiority
of our technique over packet padding and traffic morphing.
Both packet padding and traffic morphing attempt to hide
traffic features by changing packet sizes. In packet padding,
we pad all the packets to the maximum packet size (i.e.,
1576 bytes). In contrast, we apply traffic morphing by
modifying the packet of one application to look like another
similar application. Specifically, we morph chatting to be
gaming, disguise gaming as browsing, simulate browsing
as BT, make BT look like online video, pad video to be
downloading.
As shown in Table VI, The overhead of packet padding,
121.42%, is unbearably high. Traffic morphing incurs
39.44% overhead, which is less than packet padding. With
the above significant costs, the classification accuracy is
still as high as 71.18%. The results are caused by using
different ways to hide packet features. In this scenario, we
use the traffic analysis attack based on the feature, the
packet interarrival time. Since packet padding and traffic
morphing only change the packet size, they have the same
accuracy in terms of timing attack. In addition, the packet
interarrival time can reveal enough information on users’
online activities, even though all packets are padded as the
same size. Hence, both packet padding and traffic morphing
fail to preserve user privacy. Our defending method, traffic
reshaping, achieves quite low accuracy, 43.69%, without
additional communication overhead. In summary, compared
with packet padding and morphing, traffic reshaping is a
significant improvement in both privacy and overhead.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Against Power Analysis
As wireless signals fade with distance as they propagate
over wireless medium, the same transmission will be re-
ceived at different RSSI levels, depending on the distance
between the transmitter and receiver. Adversaries may adopt
wireless signal strength to infer a user’s location and,
therefore, associate packets to a specific user (or wireless
card) [23][12]. To avoid vulnerability of power analysis,
Table VI
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON (W = 5s)
App. Accuracy (%) Overhead (%) Overhead (%)
(Padding and Morphing) (Padding) (Morphing)
br. 31.37 55.55 28.67
ch. 72.15 485.74 54.62
ga. 71.68 242.96 128.42
do. 100 0.04 0
up. 95.92 0 0
vo. 91.81 1.84 1.83
bt. 37.54 63.82 62.52
Mean 71.18 121.42 39.44
we can use the per-packet-based transmission power control
(TPC) technique [24] to set a different transmission power
for each packet. This fine granularity adjustment adds noises
to RSSI values, therefore, we can disguise multiple virtual
interface as multiple users in the same WLAN.
B. Scalability
As described in Section IV-C, if a client has three virtual
interfaces, it is enough for traffic reshaping to thwart traffic
analysis. Hence, it does not cost much for an AP to maintain
all these virtual interfaces in a WLAN. In addition, AP can
dynamically distribute and configure the virtual interfaces
for each client according to the resource availability and
privacy requirement. On the other hand, traffic reshaping
does not incur overhead for noise traffic. The only message
overhead introduced by traffic reshaping is for configuring
virtual interfaces. The operation cost is also lightweight.
The computational complexity of OR is O(N), where N is
the total number of packets through the AP or the client.
Furthermore, traffic reshaping is compatible with standard
WLAN protocols and transparent to users. In summary, traf-
fic reshaping has good scalability and suitable for WLANs
deployed in residential, hotspot and campus environments.
C. Compatibility with other techniques
Traffic reshaping is efficient in defending against traffic
analysis. To make it more powerful, we can use it together
with existing solutions. For instance, we use traffic reshaping
together with traffic morphing on a virtual interface. In this
case, the accuracy will be reduced further while incurring
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much less overhead than traffic morphing. As an example,
morphing chatting to look like gaming in a certain virtual
interface, and modifying packet size of gaming to pretend
browsing, then only downloading and uploading have the
accuracy larger than 90%, others are close to zero. The mean
accuracy will decrease to less than 28%. Furthermore, if we
allow splitting packets of downloading and uploading into
multiple smaller packets, the accuracy will be reduced even
more, but it will sacrifice the network performance.
VI. RELATED WORK
Side-channel Information Leaks: Side-channel leaks
have threatened user privacy in context of secure shell (SSH)
[25], keystroke dynamics [26], [27], web browsing [1],
[2], [28], video-streaming [3], and VoIP [4][5]. Encrypted
traffic does not prevent an attacker from discovering user
privacy through traffic analysis. A straightforward traffic
analysis attack against encrypted HTTP streams is presented
in [29], [30] to identify the source of the traffic. Chen, et
al. [1] find that the significant traffic distinctions of different
websites help adversary to wiretap what the user is browsing.
Moreover, the length of encrypted VoIP packets can be used
to identify the phrases spoken within a call [5]. In a similar
way, Zhang, et al. [6] utilize the traffic features to profile
users’ actual online activities accurately.
Regarding the defense, high-level mitigation policies, such
as packet padding are likely to be inefficient or incur
prohibitively high overheads [1]. Traffic morphing [7] only
defends against traffic analysis based on packet size, which
may be easily overridden by other features. Its design also
leads to significant overhead. So an efficient defense against
the side-channel information leaks is a future research topic
with strong practical relevance.
Privacy of WiFi Networks: Due to the shared-medium
nature, WiFi communication poses a great challenge on
user privacy. Recent privacy preserving in WiFi networks
has mainly focused on location privacy and user identifi-
cation [16], [14]. From public available databases of WiFi
networks [31], it is feasible to tracking users’ location
through the analysis of the log files. Furthermore, adversaries
may adopt wireless signal strength in multiple monitoring
locations to obtain an accurate estimation of a user’s location
and motion [23], [32]. Franklin et al. [33] show that it is
possible to fingerprint drivers by using the timing of 802.11
probes.
Regarding the defense, Gruteser et al. [15] and Jiang et
al. [14] propose to use pseudonyms within WiFi networks to
hide or frequently change user identities. But pseudonyms
change MAC address at a coarse granularity, so the individ-
ual partitions of traffic may still lead to information leaks. A
wireless identifier-free link layer protocol proposed in [10]
obscures all explicit identifiers from all transmitted bits to
improve privacy, but the overhead of encryption and key
management cannot be overlooked.
Virtualization in WiFi Networks: Researchers have in-
troduced virtualization into WiFi networks, which mainly
focuses on improving network performance. A fat virtual
AP [34] is an 802.11 driver that provides aggregated band-
width of available APs, and balances their loads. Virtual-
WiFi [21] or MultiNet [35] uses a network hopping scheme
to switch the wireless card across multiple APs of wireless
LANs with one MAC address in order to improve network
throughput. The PeerBoost [36] system uses the coexistence
of infrastructure and ad hoc mode over the one wireless
card to maximize the throughput of WiFi networks. Soft-
Repeater [37], is a practical, deployable system, in which
stations cooperatively address the rate anomaly problem by
using VirtualWiFi. Different from the above papers, traffic
reshaping with different MAC addresses and dynamically
dispatches traffic flows to multiple infrastructure-based links
optimally.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose traffic reshaping to protect users’
online privacy. It creates multiple virtual MAC interfaces,
dynamically dispatches traffic flows among these interfaces,
and reshapes different traffic features on each virtual in-
terface to hide those of the original traffic. Since traffic
reshaping does not use packet padding, it thwarts traffic
analysis without additional overhead for noise traffic. We
evaluate the performance of traffic reshaping through trace-
based experiments. It performs better than packet padding
and traffic morphing in defending against traffic analysis.
The results show that the accuracy of classification decreases
from 83.24% to 43.69% when the eavesdropping duration is
5 seconds. When eavesdropping duration is extended to 60
seconds, the accuracy is reduced from 91.86% to 44.49%.
Therefore, traffic reshaping is an efficient way to defend
against traffic analysis.
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